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the individuals experience widowhood, marriage, unemployment or disability. We find 
systematic prediction errors that are at least partly driven by unforeseen adaptation. 
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1 Introduction
The question whether people correctly predict their future utility levels when facing a major
life event poses a challenge for traditional economics. To ensure utility maximizing decision-
making, neoclassical utility theory is based on two fundamental assumptions: First, people,
on average, correctly estimate the probabilities of possible decision outcomes. Second, they
know their future preferences. If these assumptions do not hold, people are unable to form
correct expectations about the utility that they will derive from alternative situations. They
are then likely to make suboptimal decisions, which will, in turn, lead systematically to lower
levels of individual welfare compared to a situation with unbiased expectations. Importantly
from the perspective of economics, this would undermine the validity of inferring preferences
from observed behaviour (see Loewenstein et al. 2003, Kahneman and Thaler 2006, and Frey
and Stutzer 2014 for general accounts of utility misprediction). However, so far there is little
evidence on how successful people are at making predictions about the development of their
future utility in response to major life events. Thus, the following questions emerge: How good
are people at predicting the adjustment process after major life events in general? And are any
errors driven by changes in circumstances or by unforeseen adaptation?
A first approach to investigate these issues studies how well-being changes around major life
events, using data on life satisfaction as a proxy measure for utility. It allows researchers to
empirically investigate the claim originally made by Brickman and Campbell (1971) that life
is characterized to some extent by a hedonic treadmill, with life events only bringing about
transitory changes in hedonic well-being. Indeed, studies show that many life events do not
lead to permanent shifts in satisfaction levels, suggesting that people tend to adapt to various
changes in life circumstances (e.g., Clark et al. 2008, Oswald and Powdthavee 2008, or recently
Clark and Georgellis 2013). Still, even with the insight that people adapt to a certain degree to
new life circumstances, it remains an unanswered question to what extent people foresee such
adjustment patterns. From the perspective of traditional economics, such an adaptation is only
problematic if it is not anticipated in the behaviour of individuals.
A second approach tries to directly examine the accuracy of people’s predictions with exper-
iments. Such studies are known as research on affective forecasting in psychology (see, e.g.,
Wilson and Gilbert 2003 or for a review from an economic perspective Loewenstein and Schkade
1999). The standard procedure to identify forecasting errors is to compare predictions with
direct measures of experienced well-being: People are asked to predict how they would feel
within a certain time period subsequent to a future event. The participants’ responses are then
compared with their, or other respondents’ actual feelings after experiencing the event. One
prevalent finding of such studies is that people tend to systematically overestimate the degree
to which they are affected from it.1
1In the psychological literature, this tendency is often referred to as the durability bias, which is part of the
so-called impact bias which reflects that people tend to overestimate the initial impact and/or duration of an
emotional event (Wilson and Gilbert 2003).
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Although there are different research designs to identify people’s hedonic mispredictions, the
literature faces two challenges. First, there is the risk of spurious forecast errors resulting
from selection. In order to address it, one can compare the predictions and the realisations for
the same individuals. However, this is no trivial task with events such as widowhood which
are hard to foresee. Second, generating data on people’s forecasts requires asking questions
regarding particular events, which makes the event in question salient. This salience potentially
contributes to prediction errors (Levine et al. 2012, 2013).
The present study combines the two approaches and tries to circumvent the two challenges by
using large-scale long-run panel data on predicted satisfaction with life. We transfer the idea
of using evaluative subjective well-being as a proxy for current utility to predicted subjective
well-being as a proxy for expected future utility. In order to study people’s ability to accurately
predict their future satisfaction level in response to major life events, we make use of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). In this annual survey, participants are not only asked about their
individual life satisfaction, but also how satisfied they expect to be in five years’ time. The two
questions both ask about general evaluations what permits testing the accuracy of people’s
predictions regarding the long-term impact of life changes without referring specifically to the
event. The data track the survey participants’ actual life satisfaction as well as their predictions
about their future satisfaction around the event in question. This allows a comparison of the
expected and the actual longterm consequences after an event. In total we use data from 14
survey waves from 1991 until 2004, consisting of over 180,000 person-year observations. The
nature of panel data thereby provides the possibility to use a within-subject (fixed effects)
approach to measure potential prediction errors in people’s everyday lives.
We extend the identification strategy applied in the literature so far, which captures the de-
velopment of satisfaction patterns around life changes. Specifically, we estimate two distinct
patterns: the first pattern shows the impact of the event on individuals’ actual satisfaction; the
second pattern shows the impact of the event on the predicted satisfaction. In doing so, we
can compare changes in predicted satisfaction right after the event with the actual changes in
life satisfaction. The prediction error in this case simply captures the difference between the
predicted long-term impact of the event and the actual impact of the event. By looking at the
adjustment process, we can show whether and to what extent life events increase prediction
errors, and thereby statistically abstract from other sources of prediction errors, in particular
individual-specific and age-specific effects. By focusing on the predictions made right after the
events, we are able to study to what extent people fail to anticipate the degree to which they
adjust to recently experienced changes in life circumstances. With unemployment, disability,
widowhood and marriage, we consider a labour market event, a health-related event and, two
events involving social relationships. Considering positive and negative events allows us to study
potential asymmetries.
The main results show substantial systematic prediction errors, with the discrepancy between
predicted and reported satisfaction being greatest with regard to widowhood. In the latter case,
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people, on average, underestimate their future life satisfaction by 0.629 points on the eleven-
point scale. The estimates indicate that people are also unduly pessimistic about their future
level of satisfaction after experiencing unemployment or disability. For marriage, the results
show that people are, on average, overly optimistic about their satisfaction in five years’ time.
We find consistent results across a range of alternative specifications. Particularly, we study the
robustness of the results regarding the use of different samples, which indicates that our results
cannot be explained by sample attrition or sample selection over time.
The overall prediction errors thereby comprise errors that are driven by biased beliefs about
future changes in circumstances as well as by unanticipated adaptation. With regard to wid-
owhood, for example, one might underpredict the level of satisfaction experienced five years
hence, because one underestimates the probability of finding a new partner or because adapta-
tion is stronger than anticipated. In order to discriminate between these two different sources
of prediction errors, we focus on individuals who remain in the respective status for at least five
years. By focusing on these individuals, who unfortunately remain in the unfavourable state
of widowhood, unemployment, or disability, we can exclude any underestimation of future life
satisfaction due to overly pessimistic beliefs about future changes. For marriage, the opposite
applies. With the exception of unemployment, individuals who remain widowed, married or
disabled show prediction errors in the same direction and that are similar in size as the results
of the analysis using the full sample. This provides first evidence that the errors are at least
partly driven by unforeseen adaptation.
Two extensions provide further insights. First, we study whether people make successively
smaller errors in their utility judgments when repeatedly facing a similar event. If so, this would
be consistent with learning having a positive impact on the accuracy of their predictions. We
consider people who experience marriage and unemployment more than once. We find that those
who remarry or have experienced unemployment more than once tend to have a smaller error
on average. These differences are not statistically significant, however. Second, we distinguish
between exogeneous and endogeneous sources for the event unemployment by focusing on plant
closure as an exogenous event for individual job loss. People who experience unemployment due
to this negative shock underestimate the degree to which they regain their initial satisfaction
level even more that the average unemployed. This is evidence against the concern that the
prediction error of those becoming unemployed is driven by a self-selection of overly pessimistic
people into unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents basic theoretical consid-
erations, a brief survey of the literature, and the general hypotheses. The data and methodology
are described in Section 3 and Section 4 presents the main results. Furthermore, we conduct two
extensions in Section 5 to provide insights regarding learning and prediction biases in response
to an exogeneous event. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
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2 Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses
When people form predictions about their future well-being, not only do they have to consider
the possible states of the world they might live in, but they also have to anticipate the tastes
or preferences that will impact their (hedonic) experiences. Consequently, mispredictions can
occur regarding their future circumstances as well as their future preferences, both of which will
lead to suboptimal decisions according to their own standards (Kahneman and Thaler 2006,
Frey and Stutzer 2006, 2014, Hsee et al. 2012). Here, the emphasis is on adaptation as a form
of endogenous change in preferences. Adaptation is thereby understood that an individual’s
emotional and evaluative response to a given change in circumstances diminishes over time. For
utility predictions to be accurate, it is therefore crucial that people correctly anticipate adap-
tation. This analytical description of forecasting obviously goes beyond the standard economic
model that assumes stable preferences and the rational formation of expectations. In the latter
model of rational expectations (Muth 1961), we expect unbiased predictions, and errors that
only occur with unforeseen new information, and which are therefore hypothesized to be ran-
dom. This allows utility maximizing behaviour, given the risk of news shocks. In the following,
we first briefly characterize the prediction problem in a framework that captures both the antic-
ipation of changes in circumstances as well as of adaptation. Second, before we derive our basic
hypotheses, we refer to previous evidence on adaptation to life changes, affective forecasting,
and the prediction of future well-being in general.
2.1 A Simple Framework of Utility Prediction After Life Events
The two sources of errors in utility predictions relating to changes in circumstances and pref-
erences can be summarized in a simple framework. In some future period t+k, individual i
experiences the utility
Ui,t+k = Ui(xi,t+k, Si,t+k)
= Ui(xi,t, Si,t+k) + βUi(∆x, Si,t+k),
(1)
depending on the initial state of the world xi,t, the potential change in circumstances Dx that
materialize or not, i.e., b={0,1}, and the state of preferences S in period t+k. We assume
separability with regard to the change in circumstances. In the context of this paper, Dx can
either be a negative change in the case of the switch from being married to being separated, or
a positive change in the case of leaving the state of widowhood, unemployment or disability by
finding a new partner, a job or by convalescing, respectively.
For the formulation of predicted utility we follow the model of a simple projection bias in
Loewenstein et al. (2003), where the predicted utility depends on the factor a=[0,1] that expresses
the extent to which individuals correctly anticipate their adaptation or change in preferences.
In our simple extension, the prediction further depends on the anticipation of the change in
circumstances. The predicted probability of a change in circumstances is reflected by the factor
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b’=[0,1]. In period t, individual i’s predicted utility is given by
PUi,t = (1− α)Ui(xi,t, Si,t+k) + αUi(xi,t, Si,t)
+ (1− α)β′Ui(∆x, Si,t+k) + αβ′Ui(∆x, Si,t).
(2)
The anticipation of adaptation can vary between a=0, i.e., adaptation is fully foreseen and a=1,
i.e., adaptation is not anticipated. In the latter case, the prediction is made on the basis of the
current state of preferences Si,t instead of Si,t+k, neglecting the change in preferences due to
adaptation. The same applies to the predicted utility that is derived from the potential change
in circumstances, weighted by the subjective probability that such a change occurs.
The prediction error, i.e., the difference between the utility predicted in period t and actual
utility in period t+k, thus amounts to
errori,t = PUi,t − Ui,t+k
= α(Ui(xi,t, Si,t)− Ui(xi,t, Si,t+k))
+ (β′ − β)Ui(∆x, Si,t+k)
+ αβ′(Ui(∆x, Si,t)− Ui(∆x, Si,t+k)).
(3)
The resulting error consists of three terms. The first term a(Ui(xi,t, Si,t)– Ui(xi,t, Si,t+k))
captures the utility differential due to the change in preferences that is weighted by the factor
a for the anticipation of adaptation. The bigger the change in preferences is, and the less
this change is anticipated (a>0), the bigger the error (that can be either positive or negative)
will be. In the case of unanticipated adaptation to the negative event of unemployment, for
example, this term would negatively contribute to the error, and thus reflect underestimated
utility. The second term (b’– b)Ui(Dx, Si,t+k) picks up the contribution to the bias that emerges
if the potential change in circumstances is not correctly anticipated. For instance, in a situation
where a newly unemployed person expects some chance to find a new job (b’>0), but where
this positive change in circumstances does not materialize (b=0), an overestimation of future
utility occurs. Hence, this term either countervails or augments the prediction error due to
the individual’s omission to consider possible adaptation. The third term ab’(Ui(Dx, Si,t) –
Ui(Dx, Si,t+k)) also captures a contribution to the prediction error caused by a change in the
individual’s preferences; this, however, only relates to a change in circumstances and only to the
extent to which that change is expected. This latter term captures the correction of the second
term to the extent that the two other sources of the bias interact; i.e., the utility prediction for
the expected change in circumstance was made under wrong beliefs about the future state of
preferences.
In order to illustrate how the framework captures a maximal prediction error, imagine the utility
forecast of a newly unemployed person. If this individual expects to remain unemployed and to
continue to feel the shock of redundancy in the future, he or she misperceives his or her future
situation by failing to consider potential adaptation to the status of unemployment as well as
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potential re-employment. In formal terms, for a=1 and b’=0, the prediction error is maximal
and future utility is underestimated in this example; first due to an omission to consider any
adaptation, and, second, due to a failure to consider a possible improvement in circumstances.
In the empirical analysis, first, the average prediction errors are estimated for people who fore-
cast their well-being after major life events. The estimates, in turn, incorporate all three terms
of equation (3). Second, in order to discriminate between the different sources of prediction
errors highlighted in equation (3), we only consider the prediction errors of people who do not
experience a change in circumstances. These people can only overestimate a change in circum-
stances, i.e., (b’–b)>0. Accordingly, for all four studied life events the prediction error that
results from unanticipated adaptation is partly countervailed by the error due to the overesti-
mation of a change in circumstances. The net effect can thus be considered a lower bound for
any misprediction attributable to the effect of (partially) failing to consider any adaptation.
2.2 Previous Evidence on Adaptation and the Prediction of Subjective Well-
Being
While it seems self-evident that people’s well-being must change if circumstances change, it is
less clear to what extent such changes persist when the new conditions stabilize. There is a
strong scientific claim of hedonic relativism in psychology (for a discussion, see Powdthavee and
Stutzer 2014 and the other chapters in Sheldon and Lucas 2014). This view is related to the
prominent work by Brickman and Campbell (1971), which proposes the idea of a hedonic (or
happiness) set point due to the process of adaptation: People get used to a new situation or
repeated stimuli and thereby return to their innate level of experienced well-being. The authors
combined their claim with empirical evidence based on tiny cross-section samples (Brickman
et al. 1978). Their conclusions provoked substantial empirical research on adaptation (for an
early review, see Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). In the meantime, it is standard practice
to conduct longitudinal analyses and to study profiles of reported subjective well-being around
life changes. This allows for individual-specific level effects to be taken into account when
exploring adaptation. Applications refer to various events such as marriage, widowhood, divorce,
birth of a child, separation, unemployment, crime victimization, and disability (see, e.g., Clark
et al. 2008, Frijters et al. 2011, Lucas 2007 and Clark and Georgellis 2013 for studies involving
multiple events, and Luhmann et al. 2012 for a meta-analysis). Particularly for widowhood,
these studies find pronounced satisfaction profiles, where the large negative effect of the death
of the spouse vanishes entirely after two to three years, which corresponds to a pattern with full
adaptation. For marriage, an early study by Lucas et al. (2003) interprets the increase in life
satisfaction before marriage and the decline afterwards in reference to the set point model. A
complementary panel analysis by Stutzer and Frey (2006) finds a similar pattern over time, but
a remaining positive well-being differential for the married. Moreover, they present evidence of
happy people selecting into marriage, which underscores the importance of using longitudinal
research designs to study adaptation. For unemployment, evidence suggests limited adaptation
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(e.g., Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew 2009 in their study of people who experience a layoff
due to plant closure). Research on disability finds partial adaptation that is more pronounced for
people facing comparatively lower levels of legally attested disability (Oswald and Powdthavee
2008). Overall, the evidence suggests that there is adaptation to changes in circumstances due
to major life events. This adaptation, however, differs across events and is far from complete
for some of them.
Given the evidence that people to some extent adapt to changing circumstances with respect to
subjective well-being, the question emerges whether such adaptation is anticipated or not. We
investigate this question below by studying the accuracy of people’s predictions after a major life
event. Previous evidence reports that individuals are not good at foreseeing how much utility
they will derive from possible future states of the world (for a review, see Wilson and Gilbert
2003 and most recently Wilson and Gilbert 2013). Research on affective forecasting shows, in
particular, that people tend to overestimate their reactions to specific events: The experience of
an event is usually embedded in other daily life events that influence an individual’s general level
of well-being. However, people tend to give these other events too little weight at the time of
their prediction. Another source for errors in predicting emotions is that people underestimate
their ability to successfully cope with negative events.2 The general notion is that people usually
have biased expectations about the intensity and duration of their emotional responses, in the
sense that the emotional impact is often less harsh than predicted, because people adapt to the
new circumstances more easily than they had anticipated. However, the explanation based on
focalism, i.e. “the tendency to focus on one event and neglect to consider how emotion will be
mitigated by the surrounding context” (Lench et al. 2011: 278), is also the origin of an important
methodological criticism of typical study designs. When people are asked about their forecasts
regarding specific aspects of their future status, a focus or salience is induced that might itself
create a bias in affective forecasting (see the discussion between Levine et al. 2012, 2013 and
Wilson and Gilbert 2013).
In our approach, we draw on forecasts that do not ask about expected satisfaction with specific
circumstances. Instead, we consider people’s general predictions of their future life satisfaction.
In a longitudinal study, these assessments can then be put in comparison to current reported
satisfaction with life when time arrives. Frijters et al. (2009) apply this approach to study the
accuracy of forecasts in the New German Laender after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but before
reunification and find evidence for clear initial over-optimism. Based on the same panel data
for Germany, Schwandt (2013) and Lang et al. (2013) document a systematic life-cycle pattern
where young people have overly optimistic expectations about their future life satisfaction, while
older people gradually become overly pessimistic about their future well-being. Schwandt argues
that this pattern in unmet expectations partly drives the U-shape in the relationship between
age and well-being.
2The phenomenon that people are generally unaware of the influence that their psychological immune system
has in reducing the negative affect is known as immune neglect in the psychological literature (e.g., Gilbert et al.
1998). This mechanism works complementarily to the tendency to overrate the impact of any single factor.
Kahneman et al. (2006) refer to the latter tendency as focusing illusion.
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2.3 Hypotheses for Prediction Errors After Major Life Events
Predictions about the direction of errors in forecasts of future subjective well-being are difficult
to draw, as these errors have potentially countervailing sources. People might systematically err
in terms of future preferences as well as circumstances. In our framework, this is reflected by
a, i.e., the degree adaptation is anticipated, and the extent to which changes in circumstances
Dx are foreseen. For the investigation of preference change or adaptation, we rely on the most
general claim in the literature, i.e., that people to a large extent neglect these aspects when
forming their predictions (a>0). Combining previous evidence that at least some adaptation
occurs regarding all the four life events that we explore (widowhood, marriage, unemployment
and disability) with the claim that people tend to disregard considerations of adaptation, leads
to the following hypothesis:
People are overly optimistic with regard to their future life satisfaction after marriage and overly
pessimistic after becoming widowed, unemployed or disabled.
This effect is, furthermore, expected to increase in the degree of adaptation. Misprediction is thus
hypothesized to be at a maximum if full adaptation to an event occurs but is not anticipated
(a=1). In contrast, it is at a minimum if there is no adaptation, or adaptation is perfectly
foreseen (a=0). However, the basic hypothesis only holds when people, on average, correctly
anticipate changes in their circumstances after the event (b’=b). The predictions for the overall
effect may be different if people’s anticipations of circumstances are systematically wrong; i.e., if
people misperceive the probability of a status change.3 In particular, if the expected probability
of a status change is lower than the actual probability (b’<b), both sources contribute to the
error in the same direction. In the latter case, we cannot empirically separate the components of
equation (3). In order to gain lower bound estimates of the potential misprediction of adaptation,
we study, inter alia, subsamples in the empirical analysis which only include people who do not
experience a change in their status. These people cannot be overly optimistic in terms of the
stability of their marriage or overly pessimistic regarding their re-employment, their recovery,
or their prospects of finding a new partner. If they are still too optimistic in terms of future life
satisfaction for marriage and too pessimistic for the negative events, unforeseen adaptation is a
likely reason.
3There is indeed evidence for an optimism bias; i.e., an overestimation of the likelihood of positive events
(see, e.g., Sharot 2011 for a review). Newly-weds might thus underestimate the risk of divorce, supporting an
overestimation of future life satisfaction. In contrast, unemployed people might overestimate their re-employment
prospects, thereby countervailing overly pessimistic forecasts of their well-being (or even reversing them into
overly optimistic forecasts). The extent to which widowed and disabled people consider they are likely to find a
new partner or recover from their mental or physical impairment is not as easy to determine.
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3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data Description and Event Samples
Our empirical analysis is based on individual-level panel data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), an extensive representative survey of the population in Germany. Since 1984 peo-
ple are surveyed and asked a wide range of questions regarding their socio-economic status and
their demographic characteristics. In the survey, subjective well-being is reported by answering
the question: “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?”. In some years,
people are subsequently asked “And how do you think you will feel in five years?”. For both
questions, respondents are asked to answer the question according to a scale from 0 meaning
“completely dissatisfied” to 10 meaning “completely satisfied”. Over thirteen consecutive years
between 1991 and 2004 both questions were asked in the survey. Thereby, item non-response
is less than half a percent for actual and less than two percent for predicted satisfaction. The
resulting data provide the information for the two key variables used in this study to investigate
potential prediction errors.
We focus our analysis on four major life events: widowhood, marriage, unemployment, and
disability. With widowhood and marriage, we consider one negative shock and one positive
life event, respectively. Unemployment refers to a major individual labour market event, and
disability captures a serious negative health shock which is also related to the work realm. As
indicators for the events, we follow the strategy presented in Clark et al. (2008) and use the
year-to-year changes of the respective statuses for each individual. For example, if the marital
status of an individual changes from married to widowed, it indicates the first observation
after the event of widowhood. The same strategy applies for the other three event types.
For unemployment, the status change to registered unemployment is decisive. Disability is
defined on the basis of a scale which indexes the gravity of the legal attested disability from
0 to 100, where a value of more than 30 categorizes the individual as being disabled. In our
baseline analysis, we only consider the first time that the respective status change occurs within
the sample period of an individual. Hence, we exclude respondents if we have no observation
indicating the point of time when they changed their status (left-censored spells), as we are
consequently unable to calculate how long they have been, e.g., widowed. We further require a
full record of observations without missing years. This assures that we observe all status changes.
For the labour market-related events of unemployment and disability, we further restrict the
sample to individuals under the age of 60 and who are not about to retire within the next five
years. This prevents expectations about retirement from systematically influencing predicted
life satisfaction. Besides only using respondents who are older than 16 years of age, we have
no further age restrictions on widowhood or disability. We require non-missing observations for
actual and predicted satisfaction with life, as well as for all the control variables. This assures
the same sample across the two key satisfaction measures. Consequently, we restrict the sample
to the period from 1991 until 2004. These restrictions leave us with a final sample of 183,727
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observations for widowhood, 64,624 for marriage, and 143,302 for unemployment. These samples
include both, people who have experienced the event in question and people who have not, but
might experience it.4 For disability, information on the status of individuals is not available in
1993. Therefore, we impute the information of the following year if a legally attested disability
is indicated in the year before and after 1993. We exclude the 102 cases where this information
is not given. Our final sample for the analysis of disability contains 143,184 observations.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Evidence
Table 1 provides a summary of the number of observations of individuals who experience wid-
owhood, marriage, unemployment, or disability for the respective years before and after that
event. As noted, individual observations are included irrespective of whether they change their
status again, e.g., by finding a new job after becoming unemployed.5 The decreasing number of
observations after the events thus derives solely from missing values in any of the variables and
from panel attrition. The uneven number of observations in the year before and after the event
is driven by the exclusion of observations around the event due to the age- and year-specific
sample restriction.
[Table 1 about here]
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A.1, exemplarily for the sample generated to study
widowhood. All the listed characteristics will serve as control variables in the respective analysis.
To initially obtain descriptive evidence, Figure 1 plots the mean development of the actual life
satisfaction and the predicted life satisfaction around the status changes.
[Figure 1 about here]
People who become widowed, on average, are pessimistic about their life prospects. This is
revealed by predicted levels of life satisfaction being lower than current levels of life satisfaction
in the years prior to the event. Given that the average widowed person is relatively old, this
4Including people who are at risk of experiencing an event in question allows estimating the coefficients of
our control variables more precisely. Depending on the event studied, people remain in the sample, on average,
for 5.4–5.9 years. Robustness tests regarding the selection of the sample and panel attrition are considered in
Section 3.5. The relatively low number of observations for marriage derives from the restriction to people who
can potentially marry. We thus exclude those individuals who are already married when being surveyed the first
time. This applies to more than 60 percent of the sampled individuals.
5This sample selection in the baseline analysis is chosen, because we are interested in the general ability of
people to foresee their adjustment process after an event. In terms of our model we thereby estimate the error
consisting of all three terms of equation (3). This focus contrasts with previous research studying patterns in
subjective well-being around life events; as for example, the study by Clark et al. (2008) or Clark and Georgellis
(2013), who exclude those people who leave the status in question from the sample (e.g., unemployed people who
find work again). Such a sample restriction would generate a systematic selection effect in our study, as the focus
would be, for example, on unemployed people who remain unemployed. This would thus be a group who only
experienced the negative realisations of potential labour market transitions, potentially making them look like
terribly inaccurate forecasters.
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observation is consistent with previous findings that older people tend to be pessimistic regarding
their future life satisfaction (Schwandt 2013). In the first interview after experiencing the event,
these people tend to be slightly optimistic. However, they are not optimistic enough, when
comparing the prediction of their life satisfaction of 5.80 in year zero for year five to their
actual life satisfaction five years after the event of 6.84. Around marriage, people are optimistic
regarding their future life satisfaction. The high expectations right after marriage are clearly not
borne out when looking at the slightly falling pattern in actual life satisfaction. Predicted and
actual life satisfaction seem closer in the case of unemployment and disability when comparing
the prediction in year zero and the realisation in year five. For all the four events, we observe
that the impact of the event on predicted satisfaction is weaker in general than it is on actual
satisfaction. This suggests that people expect the impact of the event to partially fade out,
although the prediction for their satisfaction in five years is influenced by the event in the same
direction as their current satisfaction.
Another descriptive way to approach the question of whether life events increase the average
prediction error is presented in Figure 2. It shows the distribution of the errors in a histogram.
These errors represent the difference between the predicted satisfaction with life and the actual
satisfaction five years later.
[Figure 2 about here]
For all the events, two distributions of the prediction errors are plotted. The light grey his-
tograms show the distribution for the samples restricted to people who might but do not ex-
perience the event in question. The distributions indicated by the coloured solid lines show
the prediction errors involving only the predictions in the first year after the event. Negative
values on the horizontal axis represent underpredicted satisfaction. This indicates that people’s
expectations were lower than the actual satisfaction five years later, i.e., they were overly pes-
simistic (or not sufficiently optimistic) about the future. In contrast, positive values are a sign
of forecasts that were overly optimistic. Interestingly, the histograms reveal that people make
prediction errors in both directions. After every event, there are people who think that they
will be more satisfied in five years time than they then actually are, and vice versa. Still, in the
first year after being widowed, people tend to underestimate their future satisfaction to a larger
extent than an average person who has not lost his or her spouse. The same picture emerges
for the other two negative events of unemployment and disability, though less pronounced. For
the positive life change marriage, we observe the opposite. People tend to make more positive
prediction errors meaning that they were overly optimistic the year after their marriage. The
systematic deviation in the distribution of errors between those people who experience an event
and the full sample of those who are at risk of experiencing that event presents first descriptive
evidence that people make bigger mistakes when predicting their adjustment process after major
life changes compared to the years without such changes.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
A descriptive analysis based on raw discrepancies between actual and predicted life satisfaction
has clear limitations, as individuals who experience an event might share underlying socio-
demographic characteristics related, for example, to overly pessimistic predictions. Moreover,
individual-specific differences in optimism or pessimism might drive the dispersion of the errors.
Such aspects of selection and heterogeneity need to be taken into account in order to properly
identify prediction errors regarding the adjustment process after major life events. We do this
and extend the established identification strategy that is applied when the development of sat-
isfaction patterns around life changes is studied. In this latter research, separate time-dummies
for the years around the events are used to capture the effects of these life changes on subjec-
tive well-being before and after the individual’s status changes. This allows us to estimate the
patterns shown in Figure 1 in a panel regression framework.
Our strategy comprises three steps. In a first step, we estimate the pattern of the impact of
an event on the predicted satisfaction in five years. The average impact of an event at the
time of the first observation after it occurred then includes the anticipated adjustment. In
other words, it reflects the expectations regarding the long-term impact of the event. If people
believe that they will return to their old satisfaction level within five years, the event should in
turn not affect predicted satisfaction. In a second step, we estimate the actual changes in life
satisfaction around the event. Comparable to the strategy used by other studies, the estimations
of actual life satisfaction as the dependent variable show how satisfaction changes around major
life events. We thus estimate the full pattern of the actual impact of the events, particularly
also for the period five years after the events. In a third step, the expected changes can then be
compared with the actual impact of an event five years after the event. This provides us with
a direct measure of the prediction error associated with the events, conditional on the average
individual-specific errors three years or more before the event.
Practically, for the first two steps, we estimate models of the following form:
PSit = αi +
6∑
j=−3
θjE
j
it + β
′Xit + εit (4)
LSit = αi +
6∑
j=−3
θjE
j
it + β
′Xit + εit (5)
The two equations only differ in terms of the dependent variable. PS it stands for the predicted
life satisfaction of individual i at time t, and LS it stands for the realized actual life satisfaction
of individual i at time t. Xit is a vector of individual controls. The main explanatory variables
are given by the series of dummy variables Ejit indicating the number of years j before and
after the event. The first dummy captures observations two to three years before the event.
The last dummy captures the reports of people who experienced the event six or more years
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previously. This leaves all the years prior to at least three years before the event as the reference
category. Importantly, we further include individual fixed-effects ai, which provide us with
within-individual estimates. This controls for any time-invariant characteristics, and implies
that the partial correlations are only based on variation within the same person over time.
It thus rules out that individual-specific optimism or pessimism drives the differences between
predicted and experienced life satisfaction. Still, the control strategy is not sufficiently restrictive
if such optimism or pessimism is not constant over time, because, for example, older people
become pessimistic. Therefore, the vector of control variables includes age-specific fixed effects
that capture changes in our dependent variables that are common for a particular age group.
Time-fixed effects are further included to control for systematic changes over time common to
all individuals. Region-fixed effects control for regional characteristics that might be correlated
with our variables of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. This takes
into account that idiosyncratic errors eit might be serially correlated and in turn understated
(Bertrand et al. 2004). In short, these first two steps provide the profiles for life satisfaction
and predicted satisfaction around life events conditional on individual-specific reference periods,
ceteris paribus.
In a third step, we can compare the expected long-term impact of an event with the actual
impact of the event on life satisfaction. With respect to our estimation models, we calculate
the difference between the coefficient θ0 of model (4) and θ5 of model (5) to derive the average
change in individual prediction errors due to an event. We use exactly the same observations
across the two estimation models. Any gap between prediction and realisation can therefore
not be influenced by any year- and person-specific differences between the samples. With a
reference period of at least three years before the event, the calculated difference is conditional
on the average prediction errors of the respective individuals at a time the event is unlikely to be
anticipated. The identifying assumption is thus that people’s interpretation of the scales does
not change due to the event. This condition is necessary to hold so that the average prediction
error of an individual in the period prior to three years before the event can serve as a valid
counterfactual.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Prediction Errors Following Life Events
Table 2 presents the results for the estimated models outlined in equation (4) and (5).6 For all
four events, we show the regression results for the two dependent variables side by side. Columns
labeled PS indicate estimates with predicted satisfaction as the dependent variable. Columns
labeled LS show the estimates with current life satisfaction as the dependent variable. The latter
estimates are comparable to the results in the literature exploring satisfaction profiles around
life events.
6A full estimation output including the control variables is reported in Table A.2.
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[Table 2 about here]
Column II reveals that widowhood has a large negative short-term effect on people’s life satis-
faction. Compared to their base-line level of subjective well-being three or more years prior to
the event (i.e., the reference period), reported satisfaction is 1.231 points lower. It also reveals
that the effect fades out over time. After three years, the difference is close to zero and not
statistically significant anymore. This also holds five years after the event. However, the esti-
mation results in column I indicate that people, on average, expect their life satisfaction in five
years’ time to be substantially negatively affected by the loss of their spouse. The predicted life
satisfaction is 0.611 points below the level during the reference period. In the second year, a
negative effect for the future is still predicted, though of a smaller magnitude.
Based on the estimates in Table 2, we have an empirical comparandum to the theoretical pre-
diction error, namely the difference that results when the actual impact (the coefficient for 5-6
years in specification II) is subtracted from the predicted impact (the coefficient for 0-1 year
in specification I). In the case of widowhood, the estimates indicate a statistically significant
difference of -0.629 on the eleven-point satisfaction scale.7 In sum, the negative expectations
are too pessimistic as revealed by the sizeable negative prediction error. This finding is in line
with our hypothesis that people underestimate adjustment processes that counteract shocks to
subjective well-being. For marriage, a similar but less pronounced pattern arises with opposite
signs and a smaller prediction error of 0.133 points. Newly-wed couples experience a period
of life satisfaction above their reference level (coef. for 0-1 year = 0.344 in specification IV)
and predict this higher level to hold at least partly over time (coef. for 0-1 year = 0.203 in
specification III). However, this evaluation turns out to be too optimistic with life satisfaction
being only slightly above the reference level after 5 to 6 years.
For the two shocks related to the work realm, unemployment and disability, prediction errors
resulting from overly negative expectations are found consistent with the main hypothesis. How-
ever, the two events differ from the previous ones, as people do not fully return to their original
satisfaction level, even after 6 years. This observation is in line with the literature that reports
no full adjustment for individuals who remain in the respective status. However, with our sam-
ple, we measure the initial effect of the event for all the people irrespective whether they remain
disabled or unemployed. The finding from the literature that people do not fully adjust to these
two events therefore holds even for a sample that does not exclude the people who overcome the
adverse states. Moreover, individuals tend to underpredict the degree to which they regain their
original satisfaction level after being confronted with the negative impact of the events. Regard-
7As the estimates are based on the same samples, the estimators are stochastically not independent from each
other. This requires that the covariance of the two regressors is taken into account when testing the difference
between two regressors across the two models. We do so by combining the regression results for the separate
estimations by applying the stacking method described in Weesie (1999) (implemented in Stata with the –suest–
postestimation command). This allows storing the parameter estimates and associated (co)variance matrices
into one parameter vector to get a simultaneous (co)variance matrix of the sandwich/robust type. Applying
this strategy, any difference in the effects between the estimations can then be derived by calculating the linear
combination of the two coefficients (e.g., [PS]lag01 -[LS]lag56).
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ing unemployment, they underpredict their future satisfaction by -0.218 points, and regarding
disability they underpredict it by -0.200 points.
In order to simplify the interpretation of the regression coefficients provided in Table 2, we
present the estimation results graphically in Figure 3. The black solid line shows the effects on
current satisfaction, while the red x-marks capture the effects on predicted satisfaction. In order
to facilitate the approximation of the prediction error, a red dotted line is included to assign the
event’s effect on the predictions right after the event (0-1 year after the event) across the time
periods up to period five (5-6 years after the event). The prediction error is thus reflected in
the difference between the dotted line and the black solid line in period five.
[Figure 3 about here]
As noted above, the effects of the events on the actual satisfaction levels are much larger than on
the predicted satisfaction levels. While the individuals thus might anticipate some adjustment,
the figures suggest that their predictions for their long-term adjustment are too conservative.
This holds even for the short term. Figure 3 shows that the deviations of actual satisfaction from
the baseline satisfaction level are smaller than they are from the predicted long-term satisfaction
level. This is indicated by the black solid line that crosses the red dotted line already after one
period in the case of widowhood and marriage (or two in the case of unemployment).
4.2 Robustness Regarding Alternative Samples
The estimations in Table 2 include the individuals who experienced the respective events in
question and individuals who did not experience them, but potentially could have (i.e., people
who did not lose their spouse or job, or did not marry or become disabled). Based on the
extended samples, the coefficients of our control variables are more precisely estimated, which
in turn increases the efficiency of the estimation of our key coefficients. However, this requires
that the statistical relationship between the control variables and the dependent variables is
the same across people who experience the event and people who do not. Therefore, in a first
robustness check, we conduct the regressions as in Table 2, based on samples of people who
all experience the respective events. The number of observations for the regressions is reduced
to those listed in Table 1. With fewer observations, we expect the standard errors to increase
in these estimates compared to the main specifications with the full sample. The size and the
direction of the calculated prediction errors should remain similar.
The second robustness check addresses concerns regarding attrition in our baseline sample.
Due to sample restrictions and panel attrition, the coefficient for the variable 0-1 year in the
specification for predicted satisfaction PS is not based on exactly the same observations as
the coefficient for the variable 5-6 years in the specification for current satisfaction LS. In an
unbalanced panel, people might leave the sample between the first and the sixth period after the
event. As a consequence, for some people we only observe a prediction of their life satisfaction
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without its corresponding realisation, or vice versa. If panel drop-outs are systematically related
to how people are affected by the event, the estimated prediction errors are potentially affected
by panel attrition. For example, someone could be severely affected by an event and in turn
might correctly predict low future satisfaction. If this person is more likely to drop out, the effect
on actual satisfaction five years after the event might look too rosy. This kind of selection effect
would lead to a spuriously bigger prediction error. Therefore, we also estimate the patterns
based on those individuals for whom we have both, a prediction of life satisfaction right after
the event and a realisation five years later. Accordingly, we focus on events that occur between
1991 and 1999. We are thereby able to follow the adjustment process for at least five years
for all the affected individuals. The specifications in Table 2 are thus re-estimated with a
reduced number of individuals experiencing the event (in comparison to the numbers in Table
1), amounting to 4,200 observations to identify the effect of widowhood, 10,591 for marriage,
14,521 for unemployment, and 2,719 for disability.
Figure 4 presents a summary of the resulting prediction errors for the baseline samples, as well
as the samples generated for the robustness checks. The 90 percent confidence intervals are
indicated. For all the events, the prediction errors derived from the robustness checks show
the same sign and are not statistically significantly different from the main specification. As
expected, the standard errors, and hence the confidence intervals, are slightly bigger for the
complementary estimates. The effects for widowhood and unemployment remain similar in size
and statistically significant. For marriage and disability the prediction errors are not statistically
significant anymore once only those individuals are considered, for whom the prediction and the
realisation is observed. In the case of marriage, the error is also statistically insignificant when
the sample is restricted to people who experience the event. The statistically weaker results
might not come as a surprise as the respective estimations rely on less observations. Given that
the prediction errors derived from the alternative samples are similar in size, it is unlikely that
the main findings are the result of sample selection and attrition. Accordingly, our preferred
estimation relies on the extended sample providing us with the most precise point estimates.
[Figure 4 about here]
4.3 Evidence for the Underestimation of Hedonic Adaptation
Our findings so far reveal systematic prediction errors after major life events. The patterns in
reported subjective well-being after the events suggest that the measured prediction errors could
be interpreted to some extent in terms of unanticipated adaptation. However, prediction errors
may as well occur due to unanticipated changes in circumstances. For example, people who lost
their spouse and thought that they would remain solitarily may - unexpectedly - find a partner.
Regarding unemployment, people who expect to remain unemployed due to poor job prospects,
and who are thus pessimistic regarding their future satisfaction, may nevertheless find a new job.
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In order to test for the underestimation of adaptation (in contrast to changing circumstances)
as a reason for prediction errors, we study individuals who remain in their status after a life
event. As people’s expectations about changes in their circumstances are not elicited, we cannot
include respective measures in our estimations. However, a focus on those who do not change
their status allows us to conduct a test that can be interpreted as identifying a lower bound for
the misprediction of adaptation.
The experimental scenario explaining our strategy runs as follows (see also Subsection 2.1):
Individuals form a well-being forecast based on the subjective probability b’ that they will leave
their status (i.e., that they will find a new partner, get divorced, find employment, or regain
their health) and the probability 1-b’ to remain in the status. With a correct prediction of
adaptation, those who remain in their status (realisation of b=0) are therefore likely to be too
pessimistic regarding marriage and too optimistic regarding widowhood, unemployment, and
disability. If the data show the opposite pattern - over-optimistic regarding marriage and over-
pessimistic regarding the other events - this cannot be explained by an inaccurate expectation
of the probability of leaving of the status. In the case of widowhood, for example, people who
remain solitarily can only have erred in not finding a new partner. However, in the case of
over-pessimism, unanticipated hedonic adaptation would be a consistent explanation. Note that
this strategy allows us to deal with mispredicted probabilities for changing circumstances in the
domain of the respective life event. There might well be mispredictions of probabilities also in
other life domains. However, we do not think that they are systematic beyond our controls. As
before, we control for person- and age-specific systematically misperceived probabilities by the
inclusion of individual fixed effects as well as age-specific fixed effects.
The regression analysis of our test is based on the same sample as the one used for the main
analysis presented in Table 2. However, we estimate separate patterns of actual and predicted
life satisfaction for those individuals who leave their status after a life event and for those who
remain in their respective status for at least five years. By using this specification, we maintain
the same set of reference observations as in the former regressions (i.e., the observations at least
three years before the event of all who will experience the event), as this allows us to compare
the effect sizes directly. The criterion applied to categorizing individuals as remaining disabled
requires that the gravity of their incapacity is evaluated to be above the threshold index of 30,
and that the degree of their disability has made no improvement during the first five years after
suffering the handicap. Table A.3 lists, for each event type, the number of observations before
and after the events for those who remain in the respective status for at least 5 years.8 Note that
the number of observations in the case of disability and especially of unemployment is rather
small.
Figure 5 presents the estimation results graphically (for a numerical output, see Table A.4). In
8This is the number of observations after the age- and year-specific sample restrictions and missing values
in the control variables are taken into account. Without these restrictions, the sample would include the same
number of observations spanning the period from 1-0 years before the respective event to 5-6 years after it. In
the raw data, the number of individuals who keep their status is 609 for widowhood, 1,675 for marriage, 156 for
unemployment, and 404 for disability.
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the cases of widowhood and disability, even the people who remain in their status are overly
pessimistic in forecasting their life satisfaction in five years time. For disability, the calculated
prediction error of -0.400 is even larger than if calculated for everybody who experiences the
event. With an error of -0.622 for widowhood, the size is almost identical with the result in Table
2. Figure 6 compares the average prediction errors made by all the individuals who experience
the respective events and by those who remain in the corresponding status for at least five years.
For marriage, the forecasts remain overly optimistic (with an effect size similar to the finding for
all the people who marry). The effect is, however, no longer statistically significantly different
from zero. Overall, the findings suggest that in the case of the three life events, widowhood,
disability and marriage, the observed average prediction errors are to a large extent driven by
the underestimation of adaptation (and not by prediction errors due to unanticipated changes
in circumstances).
[Figures 5 and 6 about here]
In the case of unemployment, those individuals who remain unemployed are observed to be
too optimistic regarding their future life satisfaction. Due to the small number of individuals
who experience long-term unemployment, the effect is, however, imprecisely measured. As no
adaptation is observed in the pattern of life satisfaction for the long-term unemployed, it does
make sense that no unanticipated adaptation is detected.9 The finding fits recent evidence that
the unemployed are overly optimistic regarding how quickly they will find work (Spinnewijn
2014).
5 Extensions
5.1 Learning
While individual prediction errors are no surprise given the forecast horizon of five years, system-
atic average errors are not easy to reconcile with standard assumptions about human decision-
making according to rational choice theory. In particular, we would expect individuals to quickly
realize, for example, that they underestimate adaptation processes.10 However, a large body of
literature suggests that learning is a complex process, and does not necessarily lead to overcom-
ing mispredictions. Kahneman (2011) offers an excellent account of the difficulties in learning
when different mental processes affect judgment and behaviour. In particular, learning is often
based on the recollection of past feelings. This recollection is prone to misperceptions though.
9A comparison of the patterns in life satisfaction of all the people who become unemployed and those who
remain unemployed for at least five years further reveals that both groups suffer similarly low levels of life
satisfaction when unemployed. This is consistent with Gielen and van Ours (2014) who do not observe a link
between low life satisfaction and the speed of finding a new job.
10Ubel et al. (2005) report findings of experiments which suggest that asking people to reflect on adaptation is
sufficient to reduce systematic errors in affective forecasts with respect to disability or living in a better climate.
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People reflect on specific moments from the past or access generalizations about likely emotions
in a particular type of situation (for a discussion, see Robinson and Clore 2002). The more mem-
orable moments of an experience disproportionately affect retrospective assessments of feelings.
What counts as “more memorable” tends to be the most intense moment (peak) and the last
moment (end) of an emotional event (Kahneman, 2003).11 Schwarz and Xu (2011) similarly ar-
gue that the reconstruction of past feelings draws on the same lay theories that inform choices.
As a result, people fail to notice the errors of their predictions as reconstructed memory confirms
their erroneous predictions.
In the current context, learning is additionally hampered since people experience many of these
events only once in their life and thus have to base their forecasts on their experience of other
events. Some people, however, marry or experience a spell of unemployment more than once.
It is therefore possible to study whether the prediction errors of experienced individuals are
smaller than those of people without prior experience, i.e., people who marry or experience
unemployment for the first time.
We explore the aspect of learning from repeated experience by drawing on complementary spell
data in the SOEP.12 We identify whether people have experienced marriage or unemployment
at least once before they entered the panel. This allows us to split the analysis between those
people for whom the first event observed in the sample period is also the first event in their life
and those who have already experienced such an event at least once in their lifetime at a time
before they were part of the surveys. As in the previous extension, we estimate the effects for
the two groups in the same regression in order to assure that the same observations form the
reference. Of the 1,769 individuals who we observe within the first year after their marriage,
173 have already been married earlier in their life. For unemployment, we have 665 people who
had previously experienced unemployment, and 2,564 people who are unemployed for the first
time.
Figures 7 and 8 present the results. The comparison for marriage suggests that people who were
previously married at least once adapt less to marriage, and that, on average, their prediction
error is smaller by 0.258 points. As there is a limited number of observations to identify this
latter prediction error, the small point estimate comes with a large standard error. Similarly,
people who have previously experienced unemployment, make a smaller prediction error, on
average, after experiencing the event than people who find themselves in this situation for the
first time. The difference in the errors amounts to 0.089 points. However, this difference is not
11A more fundamental reason for a person’s limited learning capacity might lie in the functionality of utility
misprediction in the evolutionary process. Rayo and Becker (2007), for example, model how humans’ utility
functions formed in order to motivate striving for improvements or more generally to maximize success in genetic
replication. Their model rationalizes that people neglect adaptation (described as self-inflicted externality).
Whether this utility function with an inbuilt prediction error is still helpful in today’s world in guaranteeing an
optimal mix between experienced utility and motivation for success in society is an open question though.
12In the spell data files, any changes in the marital or the employment status are documented for every person
in the sample from the age of 16 onwards. To generate this data, people are asked retrospectively to indicate any
status changes up to the year of their first interview. Any changes from then on are directly updated with the
information derived from the interviews. We make use of the spell datasets biomarsy for the documentation of
the marital status and pbiospe for the recording of the unemployment spells.
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statistically significant. There is thus some evidence (though statistically weak) that people learn
from repeated life events and then apply this knowledge to their future forecasts of subjective
well-being, despite the imponderability of looking through processes of adaptation.
[Figures 7 and 8 about here]
5.2 Exogenous Event: Layoff due to Plant Closure
So far, we assumed that the occurrence of an event in people’s life is independent of how rosy
they see their future. However, even if this is not the case, it does not per se pose a problem for
our identification strategy. As long as people’s more or less optimistic outlook is a stable trait,
it is taken into account in our estimation approach with individual fixed effects. For example, in
the case of marriage, overly optimistic people might be more likely to marry. This is taken into
account by allowing predicted life satisfaction to be individually higher. The evidence indicates
that even with this flexible strategy, being in the new state of marriage is related to a prediction
error.
However, there might be changes in people’s prospects making them gloomy and affecting both
their prediction of future well-being as well as their performance, for example, on the labour
market. Thus, if momentarily pessimistic people self-select into unemployment (either volun-
tarily or due to a dismissal), the negative prediction error for newly unemployed people might
reflect a selection effect. To address this, we focus on layoffs due to plant closure as an exogenous
source of unemployment (see Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew 2009 for an application of this
strategy to measure the effect of unemployment on life satisfaction). In contrast to the study of
general job loss, we are thereby able to capture an effect for unemployment on the prediction of
future well-being that is closer to a causal interpretation.
For the empirical analysis, we build on the same sample as in our main estimation for unem-
ployment before. However, we additionally restrict it to those incidences of unemployment that
are due to plant closure. For the years 1999 and 2000, this information is not available so that
we have to exclude people who experience a transition into unemployment during this period.
This leaves us with 359 individuals who become unemployed due to plant closure whereof 210
remain in the sample for at least five years.13
Figure 9 presents the results.14 A similar picture emerges as in the previous estimates on
unemployment in general. While individuals anticipate some adjustment, they underestimate
the degree to which they regain their initial satisfaction level after being confronted with the
negative shock. The highly significant prediction error amounts to 0.502 points with a standard
13The final sample consists of 109,172 observations including those people who are currently working but who
are at risk of experiencing a job loss.
14Estimation outputs are available on request.
21
error of 0.170 (p-value=2.96). This is more than twice the size of the prediction error estimated
for all the people who become unemployed irrespective of the source of their status change.
This suggests that for the event of unemployment, the prediction bias cannot be explained by
self-selection of overly pessimistic people into unemployment.
[Figure 9 about here]
6 Concluding Remarks
Optimal decision making in economics requires that people in expectations make appropriate
assessments of the utility consequences of their decisions. This also holds when people think
of their reactions in response to changes in circumstances due to major life events. The latter
involves predictions about future well-being what might be a challenge. In fact, while many
studies report well-being profiles that indicate considerable adaptation to altered life circum-
stances, it is a rather open issue whether people correctly foresee such processes of adjustment.
If systematic biases occur, suboptimal decisions leading to lower levels of individual welfare may
result. An analysis of people’s well-being predictions after major life events thus contributes
from a behavioural and welfare economic perspective to a better understanding of the complex
evaluations and decisions individuals face throughout their lives.
In the present study, we assess people’s ability to accurately predict their future well-being in
response to the loss of a partner, marriage, unemployment, and the experience of disability.
To this end, we compare individuals’ reports of predicted subjective well-being with the actual
realizations later on. Specifically, we confront patterns in reported life satisfaction around major
life events with a noncontextual prediction five years into the future for the same measure of
life satisfaction. Our empirical strategy thus combines approaches used in the social sciences to
investigate adaptation with regard to subjective well-being with approaches used primarily in
the psychological literature on affective forecasting.
The empirical findings based on individual panel data for Germany (SOEP) reveal systematic
prediction errors. While people are overly pessimistic after experiencing widowhood, unemploy-
ment or long-term disability, they are overly optimistic after getting married. In the case of
widowhood and disability, large effects from underestimating adjustment possibilities are also
measured when the sample is restricted to people who maintain their status as widowed or
disabled. As these people cannot have been overly pessimistic regarding the change of their
adverse status, the respective prediction errors are likely to be the result of their failure to
consider adaptation. There is thus some smoking-gun evidence that the prediction errors are at
least partly driven by not fully anticipated adaptation.
Overall, our study reveals that people are susceptible to misprediction after the experience of
major changes in their lives. The results back the argument of the skeptics of pure rational
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choice who assert that people’s decision-making is potentially biased by mispredicted future
well-being. From a welfare perspective, this is particularly important with regard to behaviour
that has long-term consequences, e.g., in the case of actions that are difficult to revoke. A
case in point is a legally binding commitment like marriage. Moreover, misprediction seems
most pronounced if people are likely to experience adaptation. This is in line with the evidence
related to a projection bias as proposed by Loewenstein et al. (2003). They model individual
decision-making when people systematically underestimate the magnitude of the changes in
their tastes what, in turn, can lead to misguided consumption patterns. Moreover, if there are
asymmetries regarding the degree of misprediction for different circumstances or consumption
goods, people may accrue lower individual welfare due to the misallocation of time, effort and
money across alternatives. For example, if people overrate the positive impact of income (or
the related purchase of a durable good such as a house), they might invest too much time in
accumulating income and wealth relative to enjoying leisure.
In order to derive further implications, future research has to deal with some challenges. First,
the degree to which our findings are transferable to predictions involved in economic choices
remains open. With marriage, we only consider one event that clearly captures a choice while
the other events capture shocks involving only to a limited extent immediate decision-making.
Still, if people mispredict the long-term consequences of changing circumstances, it is likely to
be relevant for any related behaviour that is based on expectations. Second, the generalisa-
tion of the findings is limited to the extent that choices do not rely on predicted subjective
well-being. However, even if predicted subjective well-being does not entirely reflect predicted
decision utility as some recent studies indicate (Benjamin et al. 2014, 2012), observed choices
of people might be distorted insofar as subjective well-being is an argument in people’s utility
function. Third, it is not at all straightforward to derive normative implications, as prediction
errors might not be detrimental per se. In certain cases, the failure to foresee adaptation might
indeed lead to beneficial outcomes, for example, when people are prevented from risky health
behavior. A more fundamental argument might even link prediction errors to advantages in
the evolutionary process (e.g., Rayo and Becker 2007). Finally, it is crucial that future research
analyses the conditions under which prediction errors are more or less pronounced. To the extent
these challenges are met in the future and we cannot sustain the assumption that people accu-
rately predict the utility they accrue from alternative choice options, economists must attempt
incorporating utility misprediction into economic analysis.
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Table 1: Number of observations before and after the event
Widowhood Marriage Unemployment Disability
Before the event
3 years and more 4,194 6,022 8,758 7,021
3-2 years 551 1,319 2,256 969
2-1 years 592 1,579 2,682 1,000
1-0 years 607 1,823 3,150 1,041
After the event
0-1 year 564 1,769 3,229 1,001
1-2 years 521 1,605 2,971 831
2-3 years 468 1,467 2,475 706
3-4 years 417 1,306 2,142 594
4-5 years 365 1,205 1,836 515
5-6 years 358 1,041 1,742 431
6 years or more 1,771 4,949 8,659 1,737
Total 10,408 24,085 39,900 15,846
Data source: SOEP.
27
T
ab
le
2:
P
re
d
ic
te
d
(P
S
)
an
d
ac
tu
al
li
fe
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
on
(L
S
)
ar
ou
n
d
fo
u
r
m
a
jo
r
li
fe
ev
en
ts
W
id
o
w
h
o
o
d
M
a
rr
ia
g
e
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
D
is
a
b
il
it
y
P
S
L
S
P
S
L
S
P
S
L
S
P
S
L
S
I
II
II
I
IV
V
V
I
V
II
V
II
I
B
ef
o
re
ev
en
t
3
-2
y
ea
rs
h
en
ce
–
0
.0
1
6
–
0
.0
8
4
0
.0
7
2
*
0
.0
6
7
0
.0
0
2
–
0
.0
4
0
–
0
.0
3
6
–
0
.0
5
0
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
5
)
2
-1
y
ea
rs
h
en
ce
–
0
.2
6
3
*
*
*
–
0
.3
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
7
3
0
.1
1
9
*
*
–
0
.0
5
3
–
0
.1
0
4
*
*
*
–
0
.1
1
9
*
*
–
0
.1
3
5
*
*
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
6
)
W
it
h
in
th
e
n
ex
t
y
ea
r
–
0
.4
3
4
*
*
*
–
0
.4
3
9
*
*
*
0
.1
7
4
*
*
*
0
.2
4
4
*
*
*
–
0
.1
2
2
*
*
*
–
0
.2
1
3
*
*
*
–
0
.3
9
3
*
*
*
–
0
.5
3
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
7
)
A
ft
er
ev
en
t
0
-1
y
e
a
r
–
0
.6
1
1
*
*
*
–
1
.2
3
1
*
*
*
0
.2
0
3
*
*
*
0
.3
4
4
*
*
*
–
0
.3
7
5
*
*
*
–
0
.8
1
6
*
*
*
–
0
.4
9
3
*
*
*
–
0
.6
4
8
*
*
*
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
7
)
1
-2
y
ea
rs
–
0
.2
6
5
*
*
*
–
0
.4
7
9
*
*
*
0
.0
9
3
*
0
.1
5
2
*
*
–
0
.2
9
7
*
*
*
–
0
.4
5
3
*
*
*
–
0
.3
7
6
*
*
*
–
0
.4
7
0
*
*
*
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
2
-3
y
ea
rs
0
.0
0
8
–
0
.1
9
9
*
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
9
9
–
0
.2
5
0
*
*
*
–
0
.2
9
0
*
*
*
–
0
.4
3
6
*
*
*
–
0
.4
6
4
*
*
*
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.0
8
)
3
-4
y
ea
rs
–
0
.0
9
1
–
0
.0
2
3
0
.1
0
4
0
.1
2
8
*
–
0
.2
7
2
*
*
*
–
0
.2
1
6
*
*
*
–
0
.5
1
4
*
*
*
–
0
.5
0
3
*
*
*
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
9
)
(0
.0
9
)
4
-5
y
ea
rs
–
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
3
8
0
.0
6
4
0
.1
4
5
*
*
–
0
.3
4
5
*
*
*
–
0
.2
0
5
*
*
*
–
0
.4
9
3
*
*
*
–
0
.4
0
2
*
*
*
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
7
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
0
)
5
-6
y
e
a
r
s
0
.1
5
2
0
.0
1
8
–
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
6
9
–
0
.3
6
7
*
*
*
–
0
.1
5
7
*
*
*
–
0
.3
4
3
*
*
*
–
0
.2
9
2
*
*
*
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
0
)
6
o
r
m
o
re
y
ea
rs
0
.2
0
0
*
0
.1
1
2
–
0
.0
3
7
–
0
.0
1
7
–
0
.4
4
9
*
*
*
–
0
.1
6
3
*
*
*
–
0
.4
6
3
*
*
*
–
0
.3
6
8
*
*
*
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.1
0
)
(0
.1
0
)
D
iff
e
r
e
n
c
e
:
–
0
.6
2
9
*
*
*
0
.1
3
3
*
–
0
.2
1
8
*
*
*
–
0
.2
0
0
*
P
S
(0
-1
y
e
a
r
)–
L
S
(5
-6
y
e
a
r
s)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.0
8
)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.1
0
)
In
d
iv
id
u
a
l
co
n
tr
o
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
A
g
e
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
(F
E
)
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
e
a
n
d
re
g
io
n
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
d
iv
id
u
a
l
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
.
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
8
3
,7
2
7
1
8
3
,7
2
7
6
4
,6
2
5
6
4
,6
2
5
1
4
3
,3
0
2
1
4
3
,3
0
2
1
4
3
,1
8
4
1
4
3
,1
8
4
N
o
.
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
3
1
,0
3
2
3
1
,0
3
2
1
2
,1
0
1
1
2
,1
0
1
2
6
,1
7
2
2
6
,1
7
2
2
6
,2
1
6
2
6
,2
1
6
R
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
4
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
3
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
4
N
o
te
s:
O
L
S
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
s.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
*
.0
5
<
p
<
.1
,
*
*
.0
1
<
p
<
.0
5
,
*
*
*
<
.0
1
.
D
a
ta
so
u
rc
e:
S
O
E
P
.
28
Figure 1: Patterns in mean actual and predicted life satisfaction around life events
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Notes: Sample sizes are according to the numbers presented in Table 1.
Data source: SOEP.
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Figure 2: Distributions of prediction errors after life events
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individuals who experience an event. The coloured distribution refers to only those observations
in the first year after the respective event.
Data source: SOEP.
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Figure 3: Estimated patterns in actual and predicted satisfaction around four major life events
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Notes: Based on the estimated coefficients in Table 2. The red dashed line is an auxiliary line
that indicates the effect of the event on the expected satisfaction five years after the event. The
prediction error is reflected in the difference between the red dashed line and the black solid line
(capturing the effect on actual satisfaction) in period 5.
Data source: SOEP.
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Figure 4: Prediction errors based on alternative samples
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estimation results in Table 2. Prediction errors for treated only restrict the samples to people
who experienced the event in question. Prediction errors for with prediction and realisation
restrict the sample to observations for predictions right after the event that are all matched
with the corresponding realisations for the same individuals five years later.
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Figure 5: Estimated patterns in actual and predicted satisfaction for those who remain in the
respective status for at least 5 years
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line that indicates the effect of the event on the expected satisfaction five years after the event.
The prediction error is reflected in the difference between the red dashed line and the black
solid line (capturing the effect on actual satisfaction) in period 5.
Data source: SOEP.
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Figure 6: Comparison of the prediction errors made by all the people who experience the event
and by those who remain in the respective status for at least 5 years
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Notes: Based on calculated differences in Table 2 and Table A.4 with 90 percent confidence
intervals indicated.
34
Figure 7: Estimated patterns in actual and predicted satisfaction for those who experience the
event for the first time compared to those who experience it at least for the second time
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expected satisfaction five years after the event. The prediction error is reflected in the difference
between the red dashed line and the black solid line (capturing the effect on actual satisfaction)
in period 5.
Data source: SOEP.
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Figure 8: Comparison of prediction errors between those who experience the event for the first
time and those who experience it at least for the second time
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Figure 9: Estimated patterns in actual and predicted satisfaction for those who experience
unemployment due to plant closure
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Notes: The red dashed line is an auxiliary line that indicates the effect of the event on the
expected satisfaction five years after the event. The prediction error is reflected in the difference
between the red dashed line and the black solid line (capturing the effect on actual satisfaction)
in period 5.
Data source: SOEP.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for the sample used to analyse widowhood
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Life satisfaction 6.997 1.758 0 10
Predicted life satisfaction in 5 years 7.029 1.915 0 10
Female 0.501 0.500 0 1
Age 44.680 16.081 17 99
Years of schooling 11.626 2.575 7 18
German 0.881 0.324 0 1
Single 0.220 0.414 0 1
Married 0.715 0.451 0 1
Separated 0.008 0.087 0 1
Divorced 0.034 0.181 0 1
Widowed 0.023 0.151 0 1
Working 0.613 0.487 0 1
Unemployed 0.058 0.233 0 1
Not working 0.135 0.341 0 1
In education 0.028 0.166 0 1
Maternity leave 0.019 0.135 0 1
Some work 0.034 0.180 0 1
Pensioner 0.114 0.318 0 1
ln(household income after tax) 10.249 0.569 0 15
No. of children in household 0.656 0.971 0 10
Size of household 2.982 1.300 1 15
No. of observations 183,727
No. of individuals 31,032
Data source: SOEP.
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Table A.3: Number of observations before and after the event for those who remain in the
respective status for at least 5 years
Widowhood Marriage Unemployment Disability
Before event
3 years and more 1,493 2,337 219 1,342
3-2 years 336 787 67 170
2-1 years 387 1,020 78 184
1-0 years 401 1,195 98 188
After event
0-1 year 384 1,176 102 183
1-2 years 380 1,142 108 166
2-3 years 363 1,123 99 139
3-4 years 350 1,075 90 117
4-5 years 325 1,039 85 103
5-6 years 340 950 70 90
6 years or more 1,650 826 42 73
Total 6,409 12,670 1,058 2,755
Data source: SOEP.
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